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Discussion Paper 
DOES FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 AS IMPLEMENTED 
AND APPLIED EXCEED THE 
DELEGATED AUTHORITY GRANTED BY CONGRESS? 
J. CLAY SMITH, JR. R 
16L 
Judicial philosophy may govern a decision to sanction a 
lawyer, the type of sanction or the amount of the sanction. such 
discretion may have built-in bias and in some cases, a 
predisposition based upon prejudice. See ABA Judicial Canon 3. 
Now if a judge does not recuse himself or herself from a matter 
because of bias or prejudice, or if a judge does not recognize a 
predisposition as bias or prejudice, real mischief can be visited 
upon a civil rights lawyer, or any lawyer in a Rule 11 
determination. 
In the March issue of the American Bar'Association Journal, 
Judge Myron H. Bright, a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, has written an article entitled, "Getting There: Do 
Philosophy and Oral Argument Influence Decisions," ABAJ 68 (March, 
1991). The article does not deal with Rule 11 per se, but it is 
instructive because, as a result of a survey that he took from 
several judges on the outcome of a civil rights case, the range of 
... Professor of Law, Howard Uni versi ty School of Law. This is 
a discussion paper delivered at Georgetown University Law Center, 
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Journal of Legal Ethics on Contemporary Issues In Legal Ethics. 
The panel discussion was on "The Use And Abuse of Federal Rule 11." 
It was moderated by Professor Laura W.S. Mackin (Georgetown). 
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disagreement on how the case should have been resolved "was 
astonishing." I believe that if a survey were taken of 100 judges 
on civil rights cases where dollar and other Rule 11 sanctions have 
been applied, the extent of disagreement would be astonishing, 
also. I believe the survey would show much disagreement on the 
appropriate sanction, if any, in these civil rights cases, as Judge 
Bright found. 
Many unspoken variables are naturally operative at the time 
of judgment under Rule 11. First of all the rule itself may be 
viewed as a prosecutorial as opposed to a remedial rule. How a 
judge views the rule will certainly be influenced by his or her 
judicial philosophy. A judicial philosophy of a judge to sanction 
·may be influenced by the quality of the briefs, the skill of the 
lawyer to persuade, the status of the party, the status of the 
lawyers, the nature of the claim, the level of knowledge possessed 
by the judge, and many other variables. I think Judge Bright's 
survey on the outcome of a non-Rule 11 civil rights case is a red 
light to why more than the reasonable inquiry standard should 
govern, and why no less than a heightened scrutiny test should be 
applied as the standard for judicial review of civil rights-type 
cases under a Rule 11 sanction. As Judge Bright said, and it is 
a statement that merits more study, "judicial philosophy or view-
point can make a difference in the result, even in a fact-oriented 
case." Id. at 71; see also, Do Judges Make a Difference, ABAJ 72 
-- -
(March, 1991). 
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Perhaps it is a litigative metaphysical accident that a number 
of sanctions under Rule 11 have been ~djudged against lawyers 
bringing civil rights claims. Maybe civil rights lawyers are 
inextricably caught in the middle of a debate among judges on whose 
judicial philosophy should be codified. Maybe federal judges 
simply are feeling the pinch of additional case loads resulting 
from the drug cases, and the asbestos litigation. See Labaton, 
Judges Struggle To Control A Caseload Crises, N. Y. Times, March 10, 
1991, at E4, col. 5. Maybe we are just in an era where legitimate 
passive virtues, which influence judicial restraint, are now 
understood by some to mean something else: close the gates of 
access to the courts in civfl rights matters. Is the threat of 
Rule 11 sanctions such a gate? I am making no charges against the 
judiciary, but there are a number of judges and scholars who are. 
Critics of Rule 11 are in the ABA's Section of Litigation, 
who have voiced opposition against the rule because "empirical data 
supports [the] contention "that sanctions have been most heavily 
levied against civil rights plaintiffs." Staib, Critics Assail 
Rule 11, 16 Litigation 1, 6 (Feb., 1991). 
Let me redirect my presentation to an inquiry at this 
symposium on Contemporary Issues In Legal Ethics: Are federal 
courts authorized by law to adopt the American Bar Association's 
Canons of Professional Responsibility as a codified standard for 
determining a Rule 11 violation? 
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Rule 83,. FRCP authorizes each district court to make rules 
governing its practice not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but like the Federal Rules, local rules of 
district courts must deal only with practice,and must not affect 
substantive rights. See e.g., Sanders v. Russell, 401 F. 2d 241 
(5th Cir. 1968) (Local rules prescribing the qualifications and the 
member of appearances of out-of-state attorneys was held invalid 
where, in contravention of congressional intent, its effect would 
be to preclude such attorneys from appearing in cases under the 
Civil Rights Act). 
According to Professor Moore's Treatise on Federal Practice, 
!' 83. 03 , "A local rule may ••• impose sanctions for noncompliance 
with the local rules," presumably in instances that do not affect 
substantive rights. Where, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
has Congress authorized Federal Courts to adopt and to apply the 
substantive provisions of the ABA's Code of Professional 
Responsibility in the enforcement of Rule 11 sanctions? 
It is my understanding, based on the "Historical Note" 
preceding the FRCP, that the rules and subsequent amendments do 
not take effect until the United States Supreme Court has first 
reported them to the Congress through the Attorney General, even 
. 
though Congress pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) has delegated 
to the Courts of the United States the power to adopt rules of 
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practice and procedure. 
A respectable number of Rule 11 FRCP supporters assert that 
Rule 11 is based on the court's inherent power to discipline 
lawyers for unprofessional conduct and they point to the ethical 
standards of the ABA Canons of Professional Responsibility as the 
standard to discipline lawyers. In fact, the sanctions under Rule 
11 appear solely related to the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. What evidence is available to support this claim? 
A few examples make the point. 
Local Rule No. 3 of the United States District court of 
Montana states, "The Standards of professional conduct of 
attorneys ••• shall include the American Bar Associations Canons of 
Professional Ethics." Under the Montana District Court Rule "an 
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action by the 
Court [f]or a willful violation of these Canons." 
Local Rule 706 of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia does not specifically mention the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility. Rather, it recognizes "Violations of 
The Code of Professional Responsibility (as adopted by the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals except as otherwise provided by 
specific Rule of this Court)." 
Rule 5 of the United States District Court (Southern District 
5 
of California) states, "The standards of professional conduct of 
the members of the bar of this court shall include the current 
canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Association •••• " 
Several other district courts have adopted, by local rule, the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility to discipline lawyers, and 
are issuing sanctions under powers granted by Rule 11, citing the 
ABA's Disciplinary Rules as the basis of their decision. See, 
e. g., J • Clay Smith, Jr., Federal Class Actions And Complex 
Litigation: Ethical Concerns 11, 15-17 (S.J.D. Diss., Geo. Wash. 
Nat'l Law Center, 1977) (local rules adopting ABA Canons of 
Responsibility prior to adoption of Rule 11). See also, Golden 
Eagle Distributing Corporation v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 
127-128 (N.D. Cal. 1984), revd 801 F. 2d 1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 
1986). While the district court's decision in Golden Eagle was 
reversed, with the Ninth Circuit concluding that "Amended Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not impose upon 
district courts the burden of evaluating ethical standards the 
accuracy of all lawyers arguments," the court specifically left 
undecided "the proper role of the courts in enforcing the ethical 
obligations of lawyers." Id. at 1542, 1539. 2 
2 Hence the Ninth Circuit left Local Rule 110-3, of the 
Northern District of California in place. The Local Rule, inter 
alia, incorporates by reference the Rules of Professional Conduct 
of the State Bar of California. Local Rule 110-3 is another 
variation of multiple Local Rules adopting or incorporating 
substantive ethical provisions as disciplinary devices in their 
Rules. Compare with United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 80S, 807 (7th 
Cir. 1983) ('" The judicial power is limited to deciding 
controversies .•• that is its function under the Constitution •••• ,'" 
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The codification of the ABA's Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility as demonstrated by several Local Rules of district 
courts and the use of the Disciplinary Rules as grounds to levy 
sanctions under Rule 11, and the bases of such Disciplinary Rules 
as justifications for Rule 11, may viblate the delegation doctrine 
announced in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 u. S. 1 (1940). Sibbach 
announced that in 1934, when Congress empowered the Supreme court 
of the United States "to prescribe, by general rules [of] 
practice," that such rules "shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor 
modify ••• substantive rights •••• " Id. at 7. (The same prohibition 
appears in 28 U.S.C. 2072(b». 
The question for debate is whether the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility as applied to Rule 11 sanctions 
violates the delegation doctrine because they affect substantive 
rights? It is arguable that these rules are substantive because 
they expose lawyers, and now, perhaps, indirectly a represented 
party, to substantive liabilities derived from the codified 
provisions of the ABA's. Standards of Professional Responsibility, 
traditionally a function of state Law. See Business Guides, Inc. 
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 59 L.W. 4144, Feb. 
26, 1991. (The reach of Rule 11 sanctions extend to nonlawyer 
ci tizens and nonlawyer-noncitizen clients). The answer to my 
quoting United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965». 
7 
question may be directly inferred from Hanna v. Plummer, 380 u.s. 
380 u.s. 460, 475 (1965». There, Justice Harlan, concurring, 
stated, "To my mind the proper line of approach in determining 
whether to apply a state or a federal rule, whether 'substantive' 
or 'procedural', is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring 
if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary 
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system 
leaves to state regulation." Id. at 475. 
I think Rule 11-exceeds the notion of federalism by empowering 
courts to adopt substantive rules governing human conduct for which 
there are state sanctions of general applicability, fairly applied 
to all persons within the profession regulated. 3 A lawyer is 
admitted to the Supreme court of a state. It is the rules of the 
Supreme Court of state that should determine, or sanction the human 
conduct of a lawyer, upon notice by a federal court. This does not 
mean that a federal court cannot disbar a lawyer for failing to 
comply with a procedural rule, but the federal courts are not 
empowered to assess fines using substantive ABA Standards, or a 
substantive sanction provision hidden beneath procedural fog. Our 
3 Nothing in this discussion should be construed as limiting 
the power of a federal court to decide independent claims 
(defenses) of discrimination against a local disciplinary bar body 
by civil rights lawyers, or political advocates, and the like, who 
can demonstrate that state law, or its application, past or present 
as been intentionally-bias or disparate in its judgments. Coyle, 
Is Court 1 s Fee Power Inherent? Nat'l. L. J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 3, 
27, col. 1. United states v. Carolene Products Co., 304 u.s. 144, 
152, n.4 (1938). 
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constitutional system leaves such punishment to the appropriate 
disciplinary body of the state. Clearly, in the face of the 
Business Guides decision, judicial sanctions giving rise to 
disparate treatment as between a lawyer and a represented party(s) 
conceivably give rise to Due Process claims in law suits against 
judicial officers, an outcome, perhaps, not anticipated or foreseen 
by the Business Guides opinion. 
I suspect that if the ABA Standards of Professional 
Responsibility are really substantive rules, touch substantive 
rights, or expose lawyers to substantive liabilities, derive from 
a substantive rule, then, it may be claimed that a major 
constitutional problem exists: Congress may not delegate to the 
courts the power to declare by rule the character of rights, duties 
or obligations, which if violated, are subject to fines under Rule 
11 not in conformance with the Presentment Clause of the United 
States Constitution. I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 u.s. 919, 946, 952 
9 
(1983).4 
The unlimited power of district court judges to sanction 
lawyers by fine under Rule 11, subject to less than heightened 
scrutinyS as a standard of judicial review, effects and alters the 
legal right, duties and relations of lawyers with their clients, 
their law firms, the local courts in their states and their 
insurance carriers. A heightened scrutiny standard of judicial 
review may not be a sufficient protection to save Rule 11 because 
a sanction amounting to a substantial fine, alone, could bankrupt 
a lawyer, drive him or her out of the profession, subject them to 
claims of malpractice by their clients, in addition to being 
exposed to public ridicule, all short of disbarment by a federal 
4 At least one jurisdiction has stated that its Rules of 
Professional Conduct are "rules of reason. The rules presuppose 
a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context 
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, 
laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and 
procedural law (emphasis added) in general. [T]he Rules presuppose 
that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, 
and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, 
such as willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating 
factors and whether there have been previous violations." Rules 
of Professional Conduct and Related Comments, Scope, at 4 (Adopted 
by Order of the D.C. Court of Appeals, March 1, 1990). See also, 
Eye On Ethics, The Washington Lawyer 28, 33 (Nov./Dec. 1990) (Rule 
9.1 imposes on bar members duties of nondiscrimination in 
employment). 
5 J •. Smith, Jr., E. Brown & L. Wilson, Rule 11 And Civil 
Rights Lawyers, Comments of National Bar Association In Response 
to the Call for Comments Issued by the Advisory Committee on the 
Civil Rules Judicial Conference of the United States, Nov. 1, 1990, 
at 2. 
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judge. fi 
The reach of Rule 11 to all who sign pleadings, motions and 
other court papers makes law "that will bind the Nation. If 7 Bowsher 
v. Synar, 478 u.s. 714., 737 (1986) (Justice Stevens, concurring). 
Money sanctions against lawyers, and their clients under Rule 11, 
for the reasons stated, affect substantive rights and may not be 
exercised consistent with the separation of powers doctrine as 
established in our Nation's instrument of rule. Ibid; ~ Hanna 
v. Plummer, 380 u.s. 460, 475 (1964) (J. Harlan, concurring). 
In conclusion, I believe that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
·Civil Procedure is a substantive Rule, and as promulgated by the 
.... United States Supreme court exceeds the delegation authority 
granted by Congress. 
6 Rule 11 is also said to "chill effect of vigorous 
representation of their clients." Hinerfeld, The Sanctions 
Explosion, California Lawver 33 (Nov., 1987). 
7 This is apparent even more after the Business Guides 
decision. 
11 
C. STEVEN TOMASHEFSKY 
LAW OF'F'ICES 
JENNER & BLOCK 
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS. 
ONE IBM PLAZA 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS SOSII 
(312) 222-8350 
(312) 527-0484 FAX 
April 9, 1991 
Professor J. Clay Smith, Jr. 
School of Law 
Howard University 
2900 Van Ness street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20008 
Dear Professor smith: 
WASHINGTON OP'P'ICC 
al OU~NT CIRCIoE, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, DoC. a0038 
(a02) U3--o0 
(IOZ) a13-8058 "AX 
LAKC P'O .. CST OP',.,CC 
ONE weSTMINSTE" PI.ACIt 
I.AKIt "OReST, II. 800"S 
(70.) a.s-oaoo 
(708) aOS-7.'0 "AX 
MIAMI O"",CE 
ONIt .,SCAYNE TOWER 
MIAMI,"1. 33131 
C30lQ oO-3S3. 
(3011) 1130-000. "AX 
Thanks very much for sending me a copy of your 
thought-provoking discussion paper on Rule 11. While I 
agree that a Rule 11 sanction certainly affects the 
sanctioned person's SUbstantive rights, it is possible to 
draw a line between that and affecting the parties' 
SUbstantive rights in the primary litigation. That is, if a 
plaintiff makes a contract claim, the Rule 11 sanction 
doesn't change the facts or the rules of decision governing 
resolution of the contract claim. 
On the other hand, a sanction or the threat of a 
sanction may so distract or disable a party's attorney that 
the attorney cannot effectively represent his or her client. 
Particularly where a solo practitioner or small firm is 
required to pay the attorneys' fees accrued by a large firm, 
the IC'::e-shifting may lmpo~;e a OCJst amuuntlny to commercial 
capital punishment. Y But despite the obvious impact on the 
Y The flip side of this situation is also a problem. If a 
sanctioned large firm or wealthy client is made to pay the 
low fees incurred by a solo practitioner with a low billing 
rate, the amount of fees shifted may be too small to impose a 
sting having any deterrent effect. If Rule 11 is to be truly 
deterrent, it should take into account the sanctioned party's 
ability to pay, like the assessment of punitive damages. But 
as far as I am aware, no court has accepted this approach and 
at least one appears to have rejected it. See Magnus 
Electronics, Inc. v. Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 626, 634 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. ct. 237 (1989). 
Professor J .. ; Clay Smith, Jr. 
April 9, 1991 
Page -2-
course of the litigation, the sanction again doesn't seem to 
change the rules of decision and, therefore, does not seem to 
me to violate the Rules Enabling Act. 
A different Rules Enabling Act question was raised 
at the recent Rule 11 hearings before the Advisory committee 
on civil Rules. According to the Christiansburg Garment 
case, Congress has mandated a different standard for 
imposition of attorney-fee shifting as to civil rights 
plaintiffs and defendants. Rule 11 has never been construed 
to grant more leeway to civil rights plaintiffs.' Arguably an 
even-handed interpretation of Rule 11 in civil rights cases 
conflicts directly with Congress' controlling mandate. 
In other words, 28 U.S.C. § 1988 enacts a 
sUbstantive law of fee shifting applicable to civil rights 
cases. Rule 11 may violate that substantive law if it does 
not abide by the statutory balance. Judges who are hostile 
to civil rights plaintiffs may use Rule 11 as a gap filler to 
shift fees that couldn't be shifted under Christiansburg 
Garment or § 1988. This seems to me a misuse of Rule 11, 
despite the differences in scope between the rule and the 
statute. 
Tnanks again for sharing your work with me. I will 
pass it along to the members of the Chicago Council of 
Lawyers Federal Courts Committee for their comment. 
~~;;::s,~'~~~~ 
C. steven Tomas 
91UUS593 
Prof. J. Clay Smith 
Howard University 
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Many thanks for the note and the enclosure. 
I am prone to agree that there is a potential conflict 
between sanctions rules and the Enabling Act. It is part of 
my job as Reporter to keep the Committee on the true path on 
that regard. 
You might want to consider my point at Georgetown as 
you publish this piece. You are surely right that local 
rules extending Rule 11 can run afoul of the Enabling Act 
and it does not surprise me to learn that some local rules 
do precisely that. District courts enacting local rules are 
frequently unaware of the limitations on their powers in 
that regard. But excesses of that kind should be 
distinguished from any excesses of the Supreme Court in 
promulgating national rules. The local rules to which you 
refer may simply be invalid if they are not consistent with 
the national rule, or if they are "substantive." 
There is a second point that strikes me as Ire-read 
your remarks. There have been, for 200 years so far as I 
know, local rules bearing on admission and discipline of the 
federal bar. There have never been national rules on that 
subject. Mostly, those local rules piggy-back on state law, 
but not, I think, wholly. You might want to take a look at 
the general subject of admissions and de-admissions to some 
of the 94 district court bars. My belief is that there have 
been over the years occasional lawyers suspended or 
dismissed from the federal court bar as a result of their 
conduct in federal court, without there necessarily being 
any discipline imposed by state authority. But I have never 
checked that out. 
PAULD. CARRINGTON, Aprll4, 1991 
I hope that these thoughts are helpful. Best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 
